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A REQUIEM FOR REQUIEMS: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF REALITY 
Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr.* 
The Law is not a homeless, wandering ghost. It is a phase of human 
Zif e located in time and space. 
-M. R. Cohen, Reason and Law 
IN the December 1969 issue of the Michigan Law Review, Profes-sor David Engdahl, in an article entitled "Requiem for Roth,"1 
became the most recent writer to tell us that current obscenity 
dogma is less than satisfactory, and to propose a fresh approach. 
Professor Engdahl thus picked up a cudgel in a battle that probably 
began six thousand years ago in some cave in Asia Minor. A wall 
artist, tired of drawing twelve-legged water buffalo, decided to try 
his hand at homo sapiens in his sporting moments. Hauled before 
the tribal council, the primordial graffitist muttered something 
about the social importance of his work. A few tribesmen nodded 
approval; but the elders modestly rearranged their loincloths and 
wagged their heads, speaking ruefully of the decadence that threat-
ened the very foundation of civilization as cavemen knew it. When 
the council rendered a verdict (probably a conviction, since very 
little erotic cave art has been found), somebody suggested that the 
council's standards were vague and unrealistic and proposed a new 
formulation. 
Proposals for "new standards" in obscenity cases would not be 
particularly troublesome but for the fact that the Court has occasion-
ally listened to them. When it has, it has often complicated the 
situation further. Professor Engdahl modestly asserts that his pro-
posals are not really new, but are "familiar" standards, "detailed 
with new precision."2 In essence, he suggests abandonment of the 
"incorporation" approach to the fourteenth amendment-an ap-
proach which we are told "has muddied the waters of constitutional 
jurisprudence ... ever since Justices Black and Douglas joined the 
Court."3 According to Engdahl, the Court has never "genuinely 
endorsed" this "doctrine of Black and Douglas."4 Professor Engdahl 
• Professor of Law, Ohio State University. A.B. 1955, Miami University; J.D. 1960, 
Ohio State University.-Ed. 
I. Engdahl, Requiem for Roth: Obscenity Doctrine Is Changing, 68 MICH. L. REv. 
185 (1969). 
2. Id. at 235. 
3. Id. at 202. 
4. Id. at 203 (emphasis added). 
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proposes a return to a "substantive due process" theory which is akin 
to, but is not in fact, the "ordered liberty" concept established in 
Palko v. Connecticut5 and tenaciously kept alive by Justice Harlan. 
Inasmuch as Engdahl's proposals involve far more than the ob-
scenity area in their implications, it seems less than likely that they 
will be adopted. However, with President Nixon diligently pursuing 
his purpose of "balancing" the Supreme Court with "strict construc-
tionists," all things are possible. In my opinion, such dubious revi-
sionism is neither a proper response to the obscenity problem nor at 
all called for at this critical juncture in American history. 
I. THE WAKE OF ROTH 
It is true that the test set out in Roth v. United States6 is mori-
bund. In a sense it was stillborn. While five Justices, only one of 
whom remains on the Court, joined in the majority opinion in 
Roth, that case only adumbrated certain considerations that later 
were forged into what has come to be known as the Roth test. No 
sooner did the forging process begin than the Court became frag-
mented on this issue, and a majority of the Justices has never since 
concurred in the test-certainly not in a compatible formulation 
of it. Today, it is not clear that anyone on the Court adheres to 
the test, other than its parent and guardian, Justice Brennan. The 
"requiem" for Roth, Professor Engdahl suggests, has been played 
in three recent obscenity cases, Ginzburg v. United States,1 Ginsberg 
v. New York,8 and Stanley v. Georgia.9 In a way, each of these cases 
can be attributed to an effort on the Court's part to utilize the sug-
gestions of academic commentators aimed at improving or clarifying 
constitutional standards for obscenity.10 Dean Lockhart and Pro-
fessor McClure were explicitly given credit for the concept of "vari-
able obscenity"11 which formed the Court's conceptual basis in 
5. 302 U.S. 319 (1937). 
6. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
7. 383 U.S. 463 (1966). 
8. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
9. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
IO. With regard to the role that legal theoreticians have played in bringing the 
constitutional doctrine on obscenity to its present state, it bears passing mention that 
the core of the Roth test was borrowed from a tentative draft of the American Law 
Institute's Model Penal Code. See 354 U.S. at 487 n.20. 
II. Lockhart &: McClure, Obscenity Censorship: The Core Constitutional Issue-
What Is Obscene?, 7 UTAH L. REv. 289 (1961). Dean Lockhart is currently chairman 
of the special Federal Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, created by Con-
gress in 1967 and scheduled to report by July 31, 1970. 
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Ginsberg v. New York;12 but their ideas could also explain the other 
two cases as well. Each case proceeds on the premise that the consti-
tutional law of obscenity could be made more rational if the Court 
focused less on the nature of the erotic material per se and looked 
more to the context in which it became the subject of a lawsuit. 
Of the three cases only Stanley can be said to have added clarity 
to the law. There is certainty in the rule that private possession of 
even hard-core pornography, for personal use in one's own home, is 
constitutionally protected. Stanley presents civil-liberties lawyers 
and professional obscenity la'wyers with many opportunities to 
build greater protection on its base. For example, one can argue 
that Stanley implies support for a constitutional right to carry 
pornography home for private use, to display it noncommercially to 
one's friends, or to supply it for such use. The case may also portend 
changes outside the area of erotica, in areas such as that involving 
the "perpetration" in private of consensual "morality" offenses. Of 
course, the decision should not be criticized solely on the basis 
that it may be extended, for law is made of such stuff. 
Ginzburg v. United States,13 on the other hand, is the most 
demonstrably unsatisfactory application of the contextual approach. 
By adding the element (or quasi-element) of "pandering,''14 it 
simply injected another problematical criterion into an area already 
overstocked with such futility-producing criteria. To everyone ex-
cept Ginzburg, the most tangible result of that case has been the 
practice of publishers to place on even the hardest-core pornography 
legends proclaiming the serious, benign, scientific, artistic, and edu-
cational nature of its purpose.H• It is to be hoped that the "pander-
12. 390 U.S. at 635 n.4. 
13. 383 U.S. 463 (1966). 
14. 383 U.S. at 471, 475-76. 
15. For example, the January 26, 1970, issue of SCREW, THE SEX REVIEW contains 
the following legend, mostly in fine print, in a small black box on the front cover: 
WARNING, ADULT TYPE SEX MATERIAL 
THIS LITERATURE Is Nor INTENDED FOR MINORS AND UNDER No CIRCUMSTANCES ARE 
THEY To VIEW IT, POSSESS IT, OR PLACE ORDERS FOR THE MERCHANDISE OFFERED 
HEREIN, 
To THE NEWSDEALER: You are warned not to sell this newspaper to a minor. If 
you do it will be ground for refusal to serve you with future issues. The editors 
of this newspaper have made every effort to insure that the contents of this 
publication are not obscene or pornographic under the law, common sense, or 
contemporary standards of candor in sex. 
Do NOT PURCHASE SCREW IF You WANT PORNOGRAPHY! 
Another publication, EROTICA, depicting males and females and pairs of females em-
bracing with exposed genitalia, contains the following legend, [reprinted in part]: 
for mature adults • • • as a pictorial representation of phases and mores of our 
contemporary society • • • • Editorial content is not to be construed as descrip-
tive or to condone any action. 
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ing" rule of Ginzburg will simply fade away. By contrast, Ginsberg 
v. New Y ork16 has touched off a spate of legislative activity, both 
federal and state; but unfortunately, its future promises only more 
confusion.17 In that case, Justice Brennan formulated the issues in 
such a manner as to permit him to proclaim in abstract form the 
principle that there can be a separate constitutional standard for 
those erotic materials that are made available to minors. Despite 
Justice Fortas' urging,18 Justice Brennan did not even suggest the 
outlines of that separate standard. In response to Justice Brennan's 
opinion, legislative draftsmen, following a time-honored practice, 
have slavishly copied the bizarre New York statute involved in that 
case, despite the fact that the Ginsberg decision never clearly ap-
proved the statute as such.19 
16. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
17. The New York statute involved in Ginsberg [Law of June 7, 1965, ch. 327, 1 
[1965] Laws of N.Y. 1066, as amended, N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 235.20-.21 (McKinney 1967)], 
and reprinted as an appendix to that case at 645-47 and in Engdahl, supra note 1, at 
195 n.66, takes an unusual and largely disfunctional approach to the problem of 
erotica and minors. First, it sets forth a detailed and rather bizarre catalogue of sub-
jects that might be considered obscene. That catalogue includes such gems as "the 
female breast with less than fully opaque covering of any portion thereof below the 
top of the nipple" and "flagellation or torture by or upon a person clad in under-
garments, a mask or bizarre costume, or the condition of being fettered, bound or 
otherwise physically restrained on the part of one so clothed." This portion of the 
statute seems to be in line with the idea of Mr. Richard H. Kuh that obscenity can 
be defined "objectively," that is, by specification of the physical scenes to be pro-
scribed. R. KuH, FoousH FIGLEAVES (1967). Kuh is still urging this position on legisla-
tive committees. 28 CONG. Q. 757 (1970). The New York legislature, however, recog-
nized that the catalogue approach alone would be unworkable. For example, the 
first phrase quoted above from the statute could prevent minors from viewing many 
works of art long considered acceptable even for the very young. The second phrase 
could be applied to a wide variety of patently nonobscene material, such as a circus 
picture depicting the pretended arrest of one clown by another. Consequently, the 
New York legislature added a modified Roth test to the statute-modified to make a 
hypothetical minor the touchstone with regard to contemporary standards of candor, 
prurient interest, and social importance. This latter, operative portion of the statute 
makes the catalogue largely superfluous. 
18. 390 U.S. at 673-75 Gustice Fortas, dissenting). 
19. As Justice Brennan interpreted the record in Ginsberg, the appellants' counsel 
attacked the statute "on its face,'' thus relieving the Court of the responsibility of de-
termining whether the particular erotic materials that formed the basis for Ginsberg's 
conviction could constitutionally be banned as "harmful to minors." As Justice Fortas 
pointed out in dissent, this was a dubious process for at least two reasons. First, it may 
have broken with the Court's tradition of not allowing counsels' position to have an 
undue influence on the Court's stewardship of constitutional law. See A. BICKEL, THE 
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), particularly at 133-43. Second, it left government and 
citizens with very little guidance as to the emerging standards in this area. 390 U.S. 
at 671-73 Gustice Fortas, dissenting). In fact, it can fairly be said that, by passing upon 
the New York statute in such abstract formulation, the Court did not approve even 
the statute itself. For while the concept of the statute-a different constitutional 
standard when minors are involved-is now judicially sanctioned, the statute could 
prove to be constitutionally unworkable in any subsequent concrete case. Certainly, 
insofar as the statute is modeled along Roth lines, it poses all the same problems 
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Thus, Roth is indeed dead, although perhaps not beyond resur-
rection. But before talking about further reforms, one might profit-
ably try to look at the shape of the phoenix that has arisen from its 
meager ashes. One need not accept the mystical view of common-
law jurists that law always exists on every subject, in order to ac-
cept the proposition that previously existing legal doctrines cannot 
be abandoned without giving some hint of what now exists in their 
place, even if it is simply the outline of the void created by their 
departure. A few vague and unrelated principles, then, can be 
drawn from the cases which have eroded Roth. A Book Named 
"John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney Gen-
eral of Massachusetts20 seems to imply that material containing even 
a scintilla of redeeming social importance will normally be pro-
tected-a position which appears to bring the Court close to Justice 
Stewart's hard-core-pornography test. Redrup v. New York21 tells 
us that soft-core, and even not-so-soft-core, pornography is acceptable 
because, in the Court's view, it meets contemporary national com-
munity standards. Ginsberg v. New York warns us that we are on 
shaky grounds when we deal with minors; and Ginzburg v. United 
States instructs us to be discreet with respect to our sales techniques, 
even if we are not discreet with regard to what we have for sale. 
Finally, Stanley tells us that if we can get our pornography home, we 
are home free. 
Assuming (as a matter of convenience rather than conviction) 
that the Nixon appointees to the Court will tend toward a more 
restrictive, rather than a less restrictive, attitude regarding erotic 
materials, these rules do not seem to be in imminent danger of 
change. In Memoirs six Justices concurred in the result, while three 
dissented. Two of the majority have departed; but so has Justice 
Clark, a dissenter, and he was replaced by Justice Marshall, the 
author of the Stanley opinion. Of the two dissenters in Redrup 
only Justice Harlan remains, with Justice Clark now replaced by 
the apparently more tolerant Marshall. In Stanley three Justices 
withheld opinion on the obscenity issue because they felt that the 
conviction should have been reversed on the grounds of an illegal 
search and seizure. There is, however, no reason to think that any 
which that case presented. Engdahl asserts that Ginsberg held that rationality is the 
only limit on legislative action concerning distribution of erotica to minors. Engdahl, 
supra note I, at 196. He cites pages 641 to 643 of the opinion in support of that asser-
tion. Id. at 196 n.74. But Justice Fortas and many others saw no such connotation in 
the passages referred to. 
20. 383 U.S. 413 (1966) 
21. 386 U.S. 767 (1967) 
1394 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 68:1389 
of those three Justices (Stewart, White, and Brennan) would neces-
sarily vote to overrule Stanley. Furthermore, the presence in the 
Stanley majority of Justice Harlan, with his deference to states' au-
thority, should act to stabilize that opinion. 
II. TRUTH REDISCOVERED 
Now back to Professor Engdahl. As noted previously, he begins 
with an attack on the "incorporation" approach to the fourteenth 
amendment-the doctrine which he claims has muddied constitu-
tional waters and which "no majority of the Court has ever genu-
inely endorsed."22 That assertion is quite misleading. While only 
Justice Black and perhaps Justice Douglas continue to assert the 
wholesale incorporation or "shorthand version of the Bill of Rights" 
theory, it is generally accepted that most of the operative provisions 
of the Bill of Rights have been "selectively" incorporated. For ex-
ample, none of the current Justices, save Harlan and now appar-
ently Burger,23 has ever suggested that the fourteenth amendment 
provides weaker protection of freedom of expression against state 
action than the first amendment provides against federal action. 
Professor Engdahl prefers to call selective incorporation the "guid-
ance" doctrine24-a characterization which is accurate insofar as it 
describes the process by which incorporation takes place. Rather 
than holding that the due process clause is simply a coded reference 
to the Bill of Rights, the Court has acknowledged that the first 
eight amendments, as developed through the case law, usually pro-
vide the best available definitions of due process and liberty. 
Of course, there has been debate about what "incorporation" 
means. For instance, Justices Harlan and Frankfurter fought this 
battle in the area of search and seizure. Although Wolf v. Colorado2G 
adopted the prohibition against illegal search and seizure as part of 
the fourteenth amendment's protection, it was not until lviapp v. 
O hio26 that the exclusionary rule was incorporated into the due 
process clause. Even after that case, the question arose, in Ker v. 
California,21 as to what extent the federal case law and statutes de-
fining illegal search and seizure should be made applicable to state 
action. While the federal statute at issue in Ker was deemed to 
22. Engdahl, supra note I, at 203. 
23. See Carlos v. New York, 396 U.S. 119 (1969). 
24. Engdahl, supra note I, at 204 n.102. 
25. 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
26. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
27. 374 U.S. 23 (1963). 
June 1970] Requiem for Requiems 1395 
be irrelevant insofar as it set a supraconstitutional standard for 
federal officers, it is generally understood that incorporation entails 
utilization of all relevant Bill of Rights doctrine in similar state-
action cases. 
"While Engdahl makes a plausible argument that early cases 
such as Gitlow v. New York28 and Whitney v. California29 suggest 
that there is a weaker protection for free speech against state action 
than there is against federal action, the immediate response to his 
admonition that such cases should not be "dismissed as archaic"30 
is: "Why not?" The fact that the ap}lroach of those cases is one which 
"has been obscured and then forgotten, rather than deliberately 
rejected"31 is hardly an adequate reason for their revival. The case-
books are "full of clinkers" that went the same way. The more rele-
vant question is, what is ·wrong with incorporation, or, alternatively, 
why is some other approach preferable? 
One problem with incorporation, according to Engdahl, is that 
although it was originally designed to supplant the "obstructionist" 
use of substantive due process by the laissez-faire Old Guard, it 
has not really done that.32 This proposition is erroneous both as to 
the origin of the incorporation doctrine and as to its effect. Obstruc-
tionism was initially eliminated by substituting, as the touchstone 
of substantive due process, the flexible standard of "rationality" 
for judicially created "liberties," such as "freedom to contract" and 
"freedom to follow a lawful occupation."33 Incorporation, on the 
other hand, was advanced as a foil to the rationality concept of due 
process, when it became apparent that the concept of judicial 
restraint was being used to strip the fourteenth amendment of its 
real substance-the protection of civil rights and liberties against 
hostile state action.34 "While one must concede that there is con-
siderable validity in Justice Frankfurter's frequent protestations 
that the difference between obstructionism and vigilant judicial 
28. 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
29. 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
30. Engdahl, supra note 1, at 207. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 202. 
33. Compare West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), with Adkins v. 
Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923). Professor Engdahl may have been misled by 
some of Justice Black's latter-day pronouncements on the limiting aspects of the in-
corporation doctrine. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507, 509-10 (1965) 
Gustice Black, dissenting). See also Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) 
Gustice Black, dissenting). 
34. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) at 68 Gustice Black, dissenting), 
and at 123 Gustice Murphy, dissenting). 
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protection of liberty is primarily in the eye of the beholder,35 it is 
nevertheless clear that the Court has seen through the haziness of 
this distinction well enough to prevent incorporation from resur-
recting review of so-called "economic-relations cases."36 For better 
or worse, a fourteenth amendment claim is virtually dead when it 
is classified as "economic." Thus, Professor Engdahl is simply 
wrong in concluding that incorporation failed to eliminate the ob-
structionist use of substantive due process. 
A lucid and persuasive exposition of the nature and purpose 
of the incorporation process is set forth in a footnote to Justice 
White's opinion in Duncan v. Louisiana: 31 
In one sense recent cases applying the provisions of the first eight 
amendments to the states represent a new approach to the "incorpo• 
ration" debate. Earlier the Court can be seen as having asked . . . 
if a civilized system could be imagined that would not accord the 
particular protection .... The recent cases, on the other hand, have 
proceeded on the valid assumption that state criminal processes are 
not imaginary and theoretical schemes but actual systems .... The 
question thus is whether given this kind of system a particular proce-
dure is fundamental . . . . Of each of these determinations that a 
constitutional provision originally written to bind the Federal Gov-
ernment should bind the states as well it might be said that the limi-
tation in question is not necessarily fundamental to fairness in every 
criminal system that might be imagined but it is fundamental in the 
context of the criminal processes maintained by the American 
States.38 
While state criminal process was of "immediate relevance for the 
case"39 there under consideration, this approach toward incorpora-
tion need not be limited to that context. If liberty requires models 
in a relatively closed system such as criminal process, can anyone 
seriously argue that guidelines are superfluous in the free-wheeling 
body politic, or that worthy traditions are any less deserving of 
perpetuation simply because they touch on an aspect of life other 
than criminal trial procedure? 
35. See Frankfurter, Self-Willed Judges and the Judicial Function, in AN AUTOBI-
OGRAPHY OF THE SUPREME COURT 441 (A. Westin ed. 1963). 
36. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). Engdahl's argument to 
the contrary is based upon the point, so intriguing to law students, that if the due 
process clause of the fourteenth amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights absolutely 
in toto, it incorporates a mirror-image of itself in the fiftb amendment. 
37. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
38. 391 U.S. at 149-50 n.14. 
39. 391 U.S. at 149-50 n.14. 
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III. WHY .ANYBODY CAN TAKE AN OATH 
To SUPPORT THE CONSTITUTION 
1397 
It finally emerges that the real reason that Professor Engdahl 
does not like incorporation is that, despite his apparent admiration 
of Justice Harlan and his scorn of Justices Black and Douglas, he 
is something of a literalist (and, of course, who is not). 
Careful attention to the language of the Constitution may try the 
patience of some who prefer recourse to dogmatic generalities; but 
if a written constitution is to have genuine meaning, the language 
of the document must be relevant in constitutional adjudication. We 
are not bound to the unascertainable "intent of the framers"; more-
over "it is a constitution we are expounding," that is, it is "a consti-
tuent act [which has] called into life a being the development of 
which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted 
of its begetters." But whatever construction we might put upon it, 
we are not free to disregard the language of the document. Faith-
fulness to language dictates neither "conservative" nor "liberal" 
interpretation, but it does provide the only basis to legitimate what-
ever ultimate decision is made.4o 
Engdahl has some difficulty with the line between literalism and 
"expounding a constitution [which has] called into life a being." 
His very next sentence after the above quotation is, "Life, property, 
and corporal liberty are protected by the fourteenth amendment."41 
The reconciliation between Professor Engdahl's literalism on the 
one hand and his preference for Justice Harlan over Justices Black 
and Douglas on the other, is that since the fourteenth amendment 
literally refers only to "due process" (not to free speech or free 
press), the literalist approach to the problem of protecting free ex-
pression against state action should be one of a more flexible 
standard of "substantive due process." 
Professor Engdahl's earlier favorable reference to Justice Harlan 
might suggest that they would both come out at about the same 
place. This is not true. Nearly everyone has assumed that adoption 
of Justice Harlan's Palko formulation regarding state regulation of 
erotica would result in far greater latitude for state suppression of 
such material than is available to the federal government.42 Review 
40. Engdahl, supra note 1, at 214. (Citations to Justices Marshall and Holmes 
omitted.). 
41. Id. (emphasis added). 
42. This includes Justice Harlan himself who wrote: 
Federal suppression of allegedly obscene matter should, in my view, be constitu-
tionally limited to that often described as "hard-core pornography" . . . • State 
obscemty laws present quite a different order . . . . From my standpoint, the 
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of state action on the basis of fundamental fairness is simply a pre-
vention-of-atrocities doctrine.43 Thus, Justice Harlan would require 
only that states act "rationally" in suppressing erotica. Presumably 
Anthony Comstock appeared rational to many.44 
Professor Engdahl, on the other hand, has in mind a much more 
vigorous concept of substantive due process. Much of his discussion 
in this portion of his article is concerned with enumerating £actors 
involved in an adjudication based on substantive due process. Sub-
stantive due process has been simply stated as a requirement that 
the legislation in question be a rational means to a legitimate end. 
Professor Engdahl points out that this test can be broken down411 
into such considerations as (1) "the legitimacy of the state interest,"46 
(2) "the substantiality of a legitimate state interest,"47 and (3) "[t]he 
means-to-end relationship between the legislation and the state 
interest."48 However, under his final consideration-(4) "the effect 
of countervailing interests"49-Professor Engdahl reveals that all the 
hubbub over incorporation may be just a tempest in a teapot: "The 
greatest interest to be weighed against any state interest claimed to 
justify state suppression of expression, however, is the interest of a 
free people in the freedom of speech itself."50 
What the incorporation problem is all about is determining 
when countervailing interests ought to be taken into account. When 
no defined personal right exists, substantive due process requires 
only that the state act rationally-which in our pluralistic society 
means that it may do virtually anything. 51 When a countervailing 
Fourteenth Amendment requires of a state only that it apply criteria rationally 
related to the accepted notions of obscenity and that it reach results not wholly 
out of step with current American standards . • • • As to the States, the due 
latitude my approach would leave them insures that only the unusual case would 
require plenary review and correction by the Court. 
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 457-58 (1966) (dissenting opinion). 
43. See, e.g., R:ochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
44. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 203-04 (1964) Gustice Harlan, dissenting); cf. 
Justice Douglas' dissent in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 650 (1968), arguing that 
even the greatest excesses of Comstock could pass a rationality test. 
45. The scientific method encompasses both the processes of empiricism and reduc-
tionism. Empiricism usually uncovers the fact that things are more complicated than 
they seem. Reductionism attempts to resimplify things by finding unifying concepts at 
a deeper level. Thus the process is complementary and progressive. The trouble with 
semantic legal analysis is the danger of going back and forth over the same ground. 
46. Engdahl, supra note 1, at 228. 
47. Id. at 232. 
48. Id. at 233. 
49. Id. at 234. 
50. Id. 
51. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
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right does exist, by incorporation or otherwise, the state must show 
a "compelling" interest.52 The compelling interest in the case of 
free expression is alleviation of a "clear and present danger that 
[the words] will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has 
a right to prevent."53 It is true, as Engdahl points out, that penum-
bra! rights, such as privacy,54 can occasionally be cut from whole 
cloth-that is, they can be based upon values not specifically al-
luded to in the Constitution. But why advocate cutting them from 
whole cloth, when the venerable Bill of Rights suppl~es sturdier 
material? Nothing would be simplified or even necessarily changed 
in result by Engdahl's reform. The Court would simply undermine 
its doctrinal framework for the protection not only of erotica but 
of free expression in toto, at a time when that protection is needed 
as never before. 
IV. ECHOES OF THE THIRTIES 
Engdahl concedes that Congress has the power to regulate the 
interstate transportation of prostitutes,55 thus accepting Hoke v. 
United States;56 but he denies that it has delegated power under 
the commerce clause to regulate the interstate shipment of erotica, 
except when the recipient is nonconsenting.57 In this discussion his 
reasoning becomes a bit tortured. First, he affirms a truism: that 
the mere fact that Congress can regulate a subject, such as prostitu-
tion or erotica, when that subject has a connection with, or an effect 
on, interstate commerce does not mean that it has general power 
over the same subject when that subject has "no connection with 
or effect upon interstate commerce."58 Then he states: "The same 
illogic necessary to sustain such bootstrap omnicompetence would 
be necessary to sustain federal obscenity legislation under even the 
broadest interpretation of the clear and present danger test."59 The 
reference to the clear and present danger test is simply poor analy-
sis. That Congress cannot exercise its power under the commerce 
clause in derogation of the first amendment is also a self-evident 
truth. But it adds nothing to clarity of thinking to attempt to speak 
52. Sherbert v. Verner, 372 U.S. 398 (1963). 
53. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
54. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
55. Engdahl, supra note 1, at 218. 
56. 227 U.S. 308 (1913). 
57. Engdahl, supra note 1, at 219-20. 
58. Id. at 218. 
59. Id. at 219. 
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of a first amendment limitation on power in terms of a lack of dele-
gated power under article I. 60 
The problem of standards is, however, more than academic (in 
the pejorative sense). In the near future, Congress may quite pos-
sibly pass new federal obscenity legislation dealing with offerings 
to minors, based upon Congress' belief that Ginsberg v. New York 
offers the federal government as well as the states some additional 
freedom to regulate.61 The Justices might well be laughed off the 
bench if they strike down such legislation on the basis of a lack of 
congressional power under the commerce and postal clauses. 
V. LIFE, SEX~ AND FREEDOM 
The Bill of Rights offered us an experiment in legally sanctioned 
freedom of expression-an experiment that was not really begun 
until the twentieth century. Even now it is only grudgingly ac-
cepted by a majority of American citizens. The majority has usually 
believed that at least three areas ought to be permanently excluded 
from the experiment: sedition, libel, and obscenity. For historical 
reasons each of these areas was treated differently. Obscenity, it was 
once said, is outside the protective scope of the first amendment 
because by definition it is devoid of social importance.62 But Justice 
Holmes told us that the experiment in freedom is an experiment in 
life itself, 63 and Freud told us that sex is most relevant to life. Still, 
the majority has generally believed that the practice of sex should 
be relegated to the marital bedroom, or to the discreet affair, with 
discussion and depiction of it relegated to the locker room and 
latrine walls. 
In a cautious effort to open up the public arena for "serious" 
discussion the Court once held that such discussion, if it takes place 
in a tasteful manner, is fully protected by the first and fourteenth 
60. The analysis also does not explain why Congress could regulate the interstate 
shipment of erotica to unwilling recipients. Engdahl refers to the "right of privacy,'' 
but none of the cases cited indicates that Congress has been delegated the power to 
legislate protection for the right of privacy. Of course, it is possible to say that what 
the federal courts can adjudicate Congress may legislate. See Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 
264 U.S. 375 (1924). But why such an inchoate power as this could override the first 
amendment when the formidable commerce power cannot is also left unexplained. It is 
possible to make an intellectually satisfying argument against the general use of the 
commerce power to regulate for patently noncommercial objectives, but Engdahl does 
not make that argument. 
61. See H.R. ll,031, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) and S. 2073, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1969), which have the backing of the Administration. 
62. R. KUH, FOOLISH FIGLEAVES 17-21 (1967), 
63. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (dissenting opinion). 
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amendments.64 Naturally, since sex is fun (or something like fun), 
the purveyors of fun for fun's sake followed the Court's decisions 
with as close an eye as did the heavy-minded Lawrences and Joyces. 
Finally, some people began to believe that sex is not only fun but 
good fun; and good fun,65 it seems, has redeeming social importance 
in and of itself. Still others argued, somewhat persuasively, that 
even the hardest-core pornography may have value, even if only to 
show that once we have had our fill of the forbidden fruit, we will 
learn that it is not really all that much; and we will then turn to a 
search for a more realistic attitude toward this most vital of life 
forces.66 
Nevertheless, this remains a minority position, and the majority 
today is in no mood to accept minority opinion lightly. The perti-
nent questions are what the Court can, should, and will do next 
in its continuing quest to preserve breathing room for minority 
views. It is submitted that the time has come for the Court to hold 
that the Constitution permits no censorship or suppression of 
erotica in the case of its distribution to consenting adults. There 
is no substantial evidence that legalized distribution of even hard-
core pornography is socially or even personally harmful,67 and there 
is some evidence that its suppression may have detrimental effects.68 
Strong popular support for control of erotica was formerly based 
upon the following paradigm, which appealed to "common-sense" 
analysis: A person with strong sexual drives becomes sexually 
aroused by viewing erotic literature or an erotic performance; and 
unable-for personal, social, psychological, or financial reasons--to 
find anyone willing to satisfy his aroused drives, he forces his atten-
tion on an unwilling victim. Deeper analysis, however, disproves 
this paradigm. First, it has been shown that when we deal with 
the violent sex criminal, we are dealing with a small, abnormal ele-
ment.69 The Kronhausen study indicated that many of these people 
tend to have strong inhibitions against sexual fantasies and that 
often their conduct is an "acting out" of drives never allowed to 
64. Kingsley Intl. Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959). The earlier cases 
following Roth seemed to be mere extensions of this principle, that is, they recognized 
that an artist might need to discuss or depict sexual conduct, to some limited extent, 
in order to make his point about sex. 
65. See, e.g., L. ULLERSTAM, THE EROTIC MINORITIF.5 (1966). 
66. E. KRONHAUSEN &: P. KRONHAUSEN, PORNOGRAPHY AND THE LAW 263 (1959). 
67. See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. at 424, 431-33 (Justice Douglas, con-
curring) and the authorities cited therein. 
68. E. KRONHAUSEN, supra note 66, at 261-89. 
69. FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 11-13 (1968). 
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reach consciousness.70 Second, empirical evidence, and common 
sense, indicate that sexual stimuli are relative and omnipresent.71 
If this is so, then the quantity of sexual stimuli is, for the most part, 
constant; it is only its nature that changes.72 In any event, the law 
has recognized, since it rejected Regina v. Hicklin,13 that it cannot 
attempt to keep the community free from any sexual stimulus that 
might affect a deranged mind. 
The argument that pornography promotes introversion and dis-
rupts more desirable interpersonal contacts74 flounders because it 
fails to prove which is the cause and which is the effect. It may be 
more likely that those who turn excessively to pornography are 
already blocked against desirable interpersonal relationships. Por-
nography may in fact provide a release for such persons and have 
the desirable result of preventing the eruption of violent, destruc-
tive, and antisocial interpersonal encounters.75 
An initially provocative argument against pornography was 
made last year by Harry Clor.76 The essence of Clor's thesis is that 
pornography degrades human life in a world that already values 
human life too little. Clar candidly admits that his argument applies 
to many materials which do not possess an overtly sexual theme; 
hence he would expand his definition of obscenity to include materi-
als depicting or describing such things as torture, brutality, mutila-
tion, or morbidity, even if no overtly sexual motif appears. But Clar 
proves too much. While everyone might agree that much that is 
written, spoken, or depicted today degrades the human condition, 
everyone would not agree on which particular items are degrading. 
The experiment in freedom of expression does not allow us to im-
pose majority judgment as to what does and does not degrade 
humanity. Thus, as Clar himself concedes, there is no clear basis 
for distinguishing between degrading material that is overtly sexual 
and other degrading material.77 
70. E. KRONHAUSEN &: P. KRoNHAUSEN, supra note 66, at 261-89. 
71. The Kronhausen study indicated that normal persons were sexually stimulated 
by such variegated phenomena as warm sand and the sound of a pistol shot. Id. at 276· 
77. See also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 509 (1957) (dissenting opinion). 
72. 383 U.S. at 433. See also Murphy, The Value of Pornography, 10 WAYNE L. REv. 
655 (1964). 
73. L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868). The Hicklin case provided that material be judged by 
the effect of an isolated excerpt upon "particularly susceptible persons." Early American 
courts adopted this standard but later decisions rejected it in favor of the "average 
person" standard employed in Roth. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488-89 
(1957), and cases cited therein. 
74. Lockhart &: McClure, supra note 11, at 296-97. 
75. E. KRONHAUSEN &: P. KR0NHAUSEN, supra note 66, at 261-89. 
76. H. CLOR, OBSCENITY AND PUBLIC MORALITY (1969). 
77. Clor cites passages from Sartre's Erostratus and Joseph Heller's Catch-22 to 
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Practice in many places has come close to eliminating censorship 
for the adult reader. Indeed, one might suggest that only enough 
condemnation and restriction remain to sustain the titillating effect 
of forbiddenness. Stanley v. Georgia has not been a particularly con-
troversial opinion. Despite the reputed conservative backlash, even 
spokesmen for "decent literature" groups no longer stress the issue 
of adult censorship; rather, the debate today focuses principally on 
minors. But the Court needs a reasonably sound doctrinal under-
pinning for the elimination of adult censorship. Memoirs put us 
on the right track. Since erotica is no longer presumptively without 
redeeming social importance, the distinct constitutional treatment 
historically given to it is no longer justifiable.78 Consequently, the 
clear and present danger test should apply. Having come that far, 
it is relatively easy to take the next step and to concede that no 
proof of a clear and present danger can be adduced in the case of 
any erotica disseminated to adults.79 Such a result has certainty, and 
is surely more soundly grounded than would be any result based 
either upon a revisionist view of congressional power under the 
commerce clause or upon a "revitalized" old-style substantive due 
process. 
VI. PROTECTING THE MODEST 
Elimination of restrictions on the dissemination of erotica to 
adults leaves us with two remaining problems: (I) erotica and the 
unwilling audience, and (2) erotica and minors. The former prob-
lem seems easier to manage. It is quite possible, and apparently prac-
illustrate his concept of degradation. Cr.oR, supra note 76, at 227-32. I think it is 
dear from the context that he is citing Sartre and Heller as people who make the 
same point with fiction which he makes with expositive writing. Yet it would not be 
difficult at all for the more censorially inclined to get the idea from Clor that Heller 
and Sartre themselves ought to be suppressed. Indeed, in the case of Heller, it would 
not even be unreasonable for the censor to conclude that he had an ally in Clor (al-
though Clor denies it). The passage from Catch-22 discussed by Clor is the crucial 
one in which Yossarian opens his friend Snowden's flak suit and discovers that Snow-
den's insides have been literally pulverized by a piece of shrapnel. Yossarian thus dis-
covers the "secret" that "[t]he spirit gone, man is garbage." J. HELLER, CATCH-22 450 
(1962). Heller obviously believes that man must accept this fact and build value on 
it. Clor, at least, suggests that it should be kept a secret. In fairness, it must be ad-
mitted that Clor makes a defense of Heller, based upon Clor's understanding of 
Heller's intention; but it will have to be left to the reader of Clor and Heller to re-
solve the adequacy of the premise and conclusion. 
78. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. at 419: 
A book cannot be proscribed unless it is found to be utterly without redeeming 
social value. This is so even though the book is found to possess the requisite 
prurient appeal and to be patently offensive. Each of the three federal constitu-
tional criteria is to be applied independently; the social value of the book can 
neither be weighed against or cancelled by its prurient appeal or patent offen-
siveness. 
'19, 38!! U.S. at 424, 4!ll-3!l CTustice Douglas, concurring). 
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tical, to advertise the availability of erotica in a most discreet way.80 
The current concern over using sex to sell products that are not 
overtly sexual, such as automobiles, is probably more of a social 
problem than a legal one. Advertisers, seeking the mass market, 
are unlikely to exceed the actual current community standard of 
candor. 
Some problems may be created by the existence of what might 
be called sexual evangelists-that is, persons who feel a need to 
"liberate" the more inhibited by forcing erotica on their attention. 
It is tempting to dismiss this issue by saying that a small but extant 
body of the law of free speech deals with the problem of proselytiz-
ing an unwilling audience.81 But the erotic evangelist is unique, 
because while a political or religious tract or portrayal may be 
viewed and rejected, the erotic liberator can win at least a partial 
victory over the unwilling audience simply by having his materials 
viewed. In the case of erotica, the medium is not only the message, 
but the medium is in a sense an end in itself. Thus, historical tradi-
tion can be recognized and the balance struck in favor of the reluc-
tant viewer. It is perhaps not unreasonable to require that the 
proselytizers for sexual liberation utilize more traditional discourse 
rather than taking the "direct action" of displaying erotica to the 
unwilling. 
Several considerations, however, should be kept in mind in deal-
ing with erotica and the unwilling audience. First, it must be re-
membered that nuisance is the evil being attacked and thus that the 
penalties invoked should be mild. Furthermore, care must be taken 
that laws preventing the display of erotica to an unwilling audience 
are not used for harassment. Finally, the courts must be on guard 
to ensure that such laws are not twisted in application so as to 
make the materials unavailable to willing audiences. 
VII. WouLD You WANT YoUR DAUGHTER To READ ONE? 
Finally, we come to the most perplexing problem-erotica and 
the child. Whether or not erotica is harmful to children involves, 
to some extent, the same considerations involved in determining 
whether or not it is harmful to adults. While all would agree that 
young minds are generally more impressionable than adult minds, 
80. A shop directly across the street from the Ohio State University law school has 
a sign which reads simply "BOOKSTORE, ADULT BOOKS AND MOVIES." 
81. See, e.g., Public Util. Commn. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952); Kovacs v. Cooper, 
336 U.S. 77 (1949); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
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how they should be impressed is another question. Some believe 
that man is born good and that unhealthy attitudes are cast upon 
him by his elders. Others believe that man is born a craven animal 
or marred by original sin and must be taught civilized values. This 
problem is still today more metaphysical than scientific.82 Even 
after one chooses a side on this issue, there is room for debate on 
the problem of erotica and the child. I£ one assumes that man is 
born good, it is still unclear whether free access to erotica is a 
liberating or a corrupting stimulus for children. Similarly, one can 
be consistent with the "need to be civilized" view of man by looking 
upon the suppression of access to erotica either as the inculcation of 
good morals or as the inculcation of sexual neurosis. 83 In either case, 
one consideration appears inescapable: because of the slow physical 
maturation of human beings, children are inevitably subject to the 
influence of adults; and thus adults inevitably choose influences for 
them. Justice Brennan sounded a familiar American, and I believe 
libertarian, chord in Ginsberg when he said that our system recog-
nizes the initial right of parents to do the choosing.84 It is not en-
tirely specious to say that laws restricting distribution of erotica to 
minors may be necessary in order to offer parents that choice. 
The primary danger of such laws is that they may be used to 
harass the distribution of constitutionally protected materials to 
adults. For example, legislation making felonious the mailing of 
material deemed "harmful to minors" into any home in which a 
child under eighteen resides would obviously affect all distribution, 
since the burden of producing guaranteed "adult only" mailing 
82. For a discussion of the legal and social problems generated by the conflict be-
tween the Apollonian and the Dionysian views of life, see generally, Laughlin, LSD-25 
and the Other Hallucinogens: A Pre-Reform Proposal, 36 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 23 
(1967). 
83. In footnote IO of Ginsberg (390 U.S. at 642), Justice Brennan cites Dr. Wilford 
Gaylin, Book Review, 77 YALE L.J. 579, 592-93 (1968). The worst that Dr. Gaylin has 
to say with regard to harmful effects of erotica on children is that: 
It is in the period of growth [of youth] when these patterns of behavior are laid 
down, when environmental stimuli of all sorts must be integrated into a work-
able sense of self, when sensuality is being defined and fears elaborated, when 
pleasure confronts security and impulse encounters control-it is in this period, 
undramatically, and with time, that legalized pornography might conceivably be 
damaging. 
Dr. Gaylin goes on to distinguish between legalized erotica and blackmarket por-
nography by suggesting that the former may have a more harmful impact on children 
since they will deem it to have parental approval. Whether or not this conclusion is 
psychologically sound, it raises fundamental jurisprudential problems (as Dr. Gaylin 
himself notes). It is basic to liberal society that the society does not fully approve of 
all that it permits. To posit the opposite would by necessity lead to the corollary that 
the law can permit only that of which the dominant elements of society fully approve 
-the antithesis of libertarian government. 
84. 390 U.S. at 639. 
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lists would be insurmountable. Applying the "less drastic means" 
approach,85 it is not unreasonable to suggest that the problem could 
be handled by requiring that there be identifying marks on the en-
velopes and by giving parents the responsibility of requiring their 
children not to open mail marked "adult." Adult bookstores should 
not be any more difficult to police than adult taverns. Certainly 
some erotica would find its way into children's hands without 
parental consent, but it always has. Libraries could permit the use 
of a parental authorization to admit minors into "mature" areas. In 
the schools the availability of erotic materials would normally be a 
political problem, for boards of education ordinarily set school 
reading standards somewhere near contemporary community stan-
dards, influenced to some degree by more liberal-minded educators. 
The problem of the dissenting teacher would arise in the larger 
context of an academic-freedom question.86 
The Court, however, cannot escape the problem of setting con-
stitutional definitions of "harmful to minors," for there are always 
those who wish to reach the youth market right up to the outer 
limits of constitutional permissibility. These groups generally fall 
into two classes. The first is the commercial interests; and with them 
I find little difficulty in allowing the community to apply its contem-
porary standards, so long as parents or guardians are able freely to 
procure restricted materials for their own wards. The second group 
is a part of a larger movement, many of whose members are them-
selves "minors," which believes that the current definition of minor-
ity is set at too high a level and that some persons currently cate-
gorized as minors should be exposed to the adult market place of 
ideas. As in the case of the dissenting teacher, this is part of a 
larger problem, which in this situation probably entails recognizing 
the evolution downward of the age of responsibility; and thus the 
problem cannot and should not be solved solely in terms of laws deal-
ing with erotica.87 
85. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969). 
86. The problem of the respective spheres of authority of teachers and school ad-
ministrators in choosing classroom material has been a frequent source of dispute 
within the teaching profession at both the secondary and higher-education levels. 
L. JoucmN, ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE 105-06 (1967). 
87. This is not to say that a unified definition of majority is the only plausible 
answer to the problem. It may be that majority can be set at different ages for different 
purposes. However, there are certain logical nexuses between certain activities so far as 
majority is concerned. For example, it is surely not totally untenable to suggest that 
those who are compelled to fight a war for a democratic nation should have a vote in 
selecting the leaders who determine whether such a war should be fought. Similarly, 
the age at which youth should be exposed to unshielded discussion of vital social issues 
cannot be completely separated from the age at which they can consider the full range 
of adult materials dealing with sex. 
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I have purposefully discussed this aspect of the problem from 
a policy-making point of view, for I think that this is the only practi-
cal way in which the Court can handle it. On the doctrinal level, it 
seems that Ginsberg v. New York88 can be read as a simple recogni-
tion of the special tripartite relationship of government, minors, 
and the Constitution, bearing in mind the admonition of In re 
Gault89 that the Constitution is not "for adults only." In this light, 
the foregoing considerations can be seen as the parameters of "clear 
and present danger" for situations in which minors are involved. 
VIII. KEEPING THE EYE UPON THE RAn. 
Constitutional problems are, at heart, social and political prob-
lems; and the Supreme Court is inextricably involved in a larger 
political and social struggle. Despite Justice Frankfurter's yearning 
for the atmosphere of a Hyde Park-an atmosphere devoid of any 
need for the legal protection of free expression90-that atmosphere 
does not in fact prevail. Furthermore, the abdication of judicial 
responsibility in this area has inexorably led to the encouragement 
of an attitude of repression, rather than to Justice Frankfurter's 
hoped-for development of legislative responsibility in the protection 
of civil liberties.91 
The Court's power is finite (in fact tentative), and its resources 
are exhaustible. Public respect for its process is its capital. But I 
believe that it succeeds best by dealing straightforwardly with the 
social problems which it confronts, as they relate to the substantive 
principles embodied in the Constitution: "If we cannot use reason 
to critique the substantive value of the Court's decisions, it is para-
doxical that we should waste so much of it on the trappings."92 
88. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
89. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
90. Frankfurter, supra note 35, at 436. See also L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
(1959). 
91. It is quite possible to accept Justice Frankfurter's and Judge Hand's premises 
without accepting their conclusions. Thus, one can accept the premise that the best 
safeguard for civil liberties lies in an enlightened public conscience, and one can also 
accept the proposition that the institution of judicial review has contributed to an 
attitude of constitutional irresponsibility on the part of nonjudicial officials and per-
haps even the public at large. But at the same time one can reject, on the basis of 
logic and empirical evidence, the idea that judicial self-restraint encourages legislative 
responsibility. Neither Frankfurter nor Hand suggested abolishing the institution of 
judicial review. So long as judicial review exists, legislators will construe the uphold-
ing of dubiously constitutional action as a victory and as encouragement for more 
and further action of the same nature, despite the Court's protestation that its action 
is based on "judicial restraint." See Frankfurter, supra note 35; L. HAND, supra note 
90; Baldwin &: Laughlin, The Re-Apportionment Cases, A Study in the Constitutional 
Adjudication Process, 17 U. FLA. L. REv. 301 (1964). 
92. Laughlin, Comments on Powell v. McCormack, 17 UCLA L. REv. 97, 103-04 
(1969). 
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Lawyers and laymen alike recognize that the Court must utilize 
doctrines and rules of decision making in principled adjudication. 
Those rules are best trusted when they are based upon time-tested 
principles, or rationally evolved from such principles, or when they 
are proved by empirical evidence or sound reasoning to be superior 
to existing principles. Too many academic commentators overlook 
this fundamental tenet of constitutional adjudication when they 
propose their intricate new jurisprudences. 
